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ANSWERING THE MUSLIM QUESTION: THE POLITICS OF MUSLIMS IN EUROPE 
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Abstract: Since at least the 1990s, there has been a huge growth in interest about the 
Muslim presence in Western plutocracies. Part of this interest has been due to series of 
moral panics which have centred on the figure of the Muslim. The mobilisation of 
Muslims as Muslims has raised questions about national identity and belonging. 
Increasing interest is also due to the way in which the security threat - as posited by the 
„war on terror‟ - has been focused on the Muslim question as a means of reconfiguring 
the liberal-democratic contours of Western plutocracies. The responses to the attacks 
in the United States on 11 September 2001, Madrid on 11 March 2004 and London on 
7 July 2005 have been the most obvious examples of the way in which issues of 
national security have become conflated with issues of national cultural integrity. The 
very continuity of Western liberal-democratic traditions is being contested around the 
Muslim presence. This paper explores the problematisation of a Muslim presence 
outside Muslimistan, by interrogating the concept of a European Islam.   
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When we are afraid of others we believe that they 
hate us, and when we think they hate us we doubt 





“In heart I am a Moslem (sic); in heart I am an American; in heart I am Moslem, in 
heart I'm an American artist…”, so said Patti Smith. This was way back before the 
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Islamic Revolution, before the Rushdie affair, before Affair Foulard, before the 
murder of Theo van Gogh, before the Danish cartoon affair, and of course, before the 
war on terror. It is increasingly difficult to imagine, from today‟s perspective, how it 
would be possible to establish equivalence between American, Muslim and Art. Does 
not America and Muslim signify opposition between Western and non-Western and 
does not antagonism between Art and Muslim represent a deep antagonism between 
rigid orthodoxy and enlightened self-expression? Since at least the 1990s, there has 
been a huge growth in interest about the Muslim presence in Western plutocracies. 
Part of this interest has been due to series of moral panics, as noted above. What 
unifies these moral panics - despite their local contexts and specific histories – is the 
way in which mobilization of Muslim identity has raised questions about national 
identity and belonging. Increasing interest is also due to the way in which the security 
threat - as posited by the „war on terror‟ - has been focused on the Muslim question 
as a means of reconfiguring the liberal-democratic contours of Western plutocracies. 
The responses to the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, Madrid on 
11 March 2004 and London on 7 July 2005 have been the most obvious examples of 
the way in which issues of national security have become conflated with issues of 
national cultural integrity. The very continuity of Western liberal-democratic traditions 
is being contested around the figure of the Muslim. The metaphorical excess of 
“Muslim” and “Western” points to the politicization of these labels, since they operate 
as surfaces of inscription for a wide range of demands and mobilizations that are not 
reducible to the facticity of being Western or being Muslim. Islam and the West 
become the names of antagonistic global projects which increasingly polarize the 
world and its history. It is in this context that the presence of ethnically marked 
populations in the European Union, which increasingly define themselves and are 
defined by others as being Muslim, assume a critical importance.  
The regulation and disciplining of Muslim-ness has become a mechanism by 
which the state authorities have been able to introduce measures which seemingly 
threaten to roll back many of the cherished democratic institutions and practices of 
civil society. As William Connolly (2005: 6) writes:  
 
The cold war generated McCarthyism as an extreme response to the threats that the 
Soviet Union posed to Christian faith and capitalism together. The terrorism of Al-
Qaeda, in turn, generates new fears, hostilities, and priorities. The McCarthyism of our 
day, if it arrives, will connect internal state security to an exclusionary version of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. 
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Thus the Muslim question is not only of importance for ethnographers, urban 
planners, and local government officials; it is currently at the heart of the debates 
about the nature of European-ness itself.  
On the one hand, it is assumed that the presence of so many Muslims in the 
urban heart of the European Union subverts the binary opposition between Islam and 
the West. On the other hand, it is argued that the persistence of Muslims in Europe 
constitutes one of the gravest threats to European societies and cultures – in that it 
provides the sea in which the jihadist infiltration of Europe can proceed. Thus, the 
presence of Muslims qua Muslims has a general resonance that goes beyond the 
actuality of Muslims living in the European Union. One way proposed to resolve this 
dilemma has been to articulate a European Islam. This approach emerges from 
diverse points of the political spectrum and from some who are hostile to Islam and 
Muslims as well as from those who are not. So what would a European Islam look 
like?  
One approach that we can immediately dismiss, is one that uses a geographical 
notion of Europe to locate European Islam – in Andalusia, or Islamicate Sicily, or 
Bosnia, or in the „indigenous‟ Muslim populations like Pomaks in Bulgaria, or Tartars 
in Finland. Historically, the idea of what became Europe was based on the exclusion 
of what had been under Islamicate control, hence instances of European Islam, if 
they are to be substantive, cannot be reduced to a retrospective projection of 
cartographic exercises.  
Another approach that we can also reject quickly is that which understands 
European Islam as simply an ethnographic description. In other words, that Muslims 
living in Europe are going to inflect their Islam with European accents. It is really not 
that interesting (or that novel) to say that Islam in Europe is different from Islam in 
Muslimstan. No doubt Muslims in Germany, in Paris or in Bradford have 
particularities that they may not share with Muslims living in Thailand, in Amsterdam 
or Utrecht. These local inflections however do not constitute distinct multiple “little 
Islams”. The attempt to argue for a world of multiple Islam is a rather hurried 
response to the threat of essentializing Islam. Multiple Islams would only make sense 
if they could be said to exist in splendid isolation from each other, hermetically sealed 
and unaffected and fully self contained in whatever locale (it is not clear what would 
be the proper zone of demarcation of these multiple Islams. Would there be a British 
Islam or Islam for London or Manchester?) One does not need to posit an essence to 
Islam to argue that Islam is not reducible to its ontic manifestations. All the particular 
expressions of Islam do so in the name of a singular Islam: at the most, we have rival 
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projects to interpret a singular Islam.33 Indeed, it is precisely the existence of a 
singular Islam as signifier that allows the constitution of an Islamicate politics, in 
which Muslims (and also non-Muslims) wage wars of interpretation to attach the 
signifier of Islam to the signified of their various specific projects. The knowledge that 
Islam may be used as the means of articulating a multiplicity of positions is not 
grounds to assume that we are dealing with distinct multiple Islams. Dialectal 
variation is not sufficient to constitute a distinct language, nor should it cause us to 
jump to the conclusion that these local attunements and particularities of Muslims 
posit distinct Islams.  
If we reject the cartographic and ethnographic descriptions of European Islam as 
being either banal or flawed, then what, if anything, can be meant by the idea of a 
European Islam? To answer this question requires abandoning the primacy of the 
matrix of ontic studies. That is, studies that posit an essence that underpins (and 
predetermines) any subsequent investigation (Thomson, 2006). For the most part, 
depictions of Muslims in Europe (including official, journalistic, academic and 
popular) are represented in terms of an „immigrant imaginary‟ (Sayyid, 2004; Hesse 
and Sayyid, 2006). This immigrant imaginary provides a reservoir of highly mobile 
tropes which have been used over time to mark out various groups of ex-colonial and 
ethnically marked settlers.  
 
THE IMMIGRANT IMAGINARY 
The immigrant imaginary is a series of identifications by which the emergence of 
non-Europeaness within the spaces of naturalized Europeaness is made 
comprehensible, coherent and concrete. The immigrant imaginary is a product of 
various historical constructs around notions of Europeaness; its representations are 
penetrated by various discursive practices culled from coloniality, racism, and 
Orientalism. These elements are marshalled and represented as way of 
understanding postcolonial settlement of Europe by resignifying the relationship 
between peoples and places in the context of displacement of Europeaness from the 
centre of the world. It is possible, at the analytical level, to distinguish four key 
features of this imaginary. 
First, the immigrant imaginary sees distinction between the host society and the 
immigrants as being ontological.  Immigrants and host societies refer to different 
order of being. This difference is marked in a variety of ways. The immigrants‟ food 
smells, their music is loud, their family structures are either anarchic or oppressive, 
                                               
33
 See Sayyid, 2003, for a critique of the notion of local little Islams, pp. 34-36. 
03. O imaginário europeu a partir da controvérsia dos cartoons: desenhando civilizações? 
90 
their everyday conduct is different from that of “normal people.” Whereas the host 
society has networks, immigrants have kinship; whereas the host society has 
modernity, the immigrants are tradition-bound. Or, for example, consider the way in 
which “settler” communities have too often been considered to be outside the pale of 
proper politics. It is thought that their activities can be explained in terms of 
“factionalism” or machinations of egotistical community leaders.  
Secondly, the immigrant experiences are seen as either an exotic or banal. The 
tendency to exoticize treats the immigrant as representing something exceptional: a 
manifestation of difference, expressed in signifiers of ritual, dress, and life in general. 
This is countered by the seemingly opposite tendency to make the immigrant the 
same. The bland sameness produced by banalization empties the Other of any 
particularity, by reducing the Other to a superstructual moment of a more general 
and deeper infrastructure. This may be defined in terms of either their genetic make-
up, or their evolutionary development into the essence of what is human. In other 
words, under their (often darker) skins immigrants are not different from the ethnically 
unmarked. There is nothing seriously distinctive about them. In other words, the 
exoticization of the immigrant works by treating every aspect of the immigrant 
experience as being distinct. The banalization of the immigrant works by considering 
the immigrant to be indistinct. Both these modes of appropriating the immigrant, 
despite their superficial opposition, are based on the assumption that the ethnically 
unmarked provide the norm by which the immigrant is to be judged. In other words, 
the ethnically unmarked represents the quintessential human.  
Thirdly, the immigrant imaginary assumes that, with the passage of time, the 
ontological distinction between immigrant and host will be eroded, as the host society 
consumes the immigrants. (This consumption is not purely metaphorical, for the 
commercialisation of aspects of the immigrant experience, particularly in areas of 
cuisine and costume, are often cited as examples of how immigrants are being 
integrated into society, since their food and clothes are being sold to the general 
public). It assumes that, over time, immigrants will integrate into the host culture. The 
degree of integration into the host culture ranges from uncritical assimilation (in 
which the immigrant disappears without a trace into the host society) to equally un-
theorized hybridization (in which the immigrant ends up being a hyphenated and 
hybridized member of the host community, i.e. adding colour and cuisine to the host 
society). Whatever route they take, these immigrants will find that all roads lead to 
their eventual elimination as distinct populations. Furthermore, the act of 
consumption by the host will not substantively transform the host – the host remains 
the same. It is the immigrants who are chewed up and digested. This trope manifests 
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itself in the speeches of politicians and the commentaries of opinion-makers as 
exhortations to immigrants to speed up the process of assimilation by eliminating 
whatever practice is considered to be the current cause of moral panics – e.g. 
arranged marriages, „matriarchal‟ households, cultural schizophrenia, or youth 
delinquency. 
Fourthly, the form of this integration can be represented in discrete and 
successive stages called generations. A generation is one of the key units of analysis 
in this type of narrative. Generations are considered to be permanent units by which 
the immigration experience can be accounted for while continuing to maintain the 
status of immigrants. Generational differences are articulated as the crystallization of 
changes that immigrants are supposed to go through over time. Each generation 
marks the progress towards integration into the host community. The immigrant 
imaginary presents a picture analogous to the way in which tadpoles are transformed 
over time into full-grown frogs. The use of the concept of generations within the 
immigrant imaginary performs two functions. First, it prevents the completion of the 
process of immigration. The prefixing of „first‟, „second‟ or „third‟ to generation defers 
the moment when the immigrants can be considered settlers, i.e. fully part of the 
society in which they reside. The ethnically marked ex-colonial settlers become 
permanent immigrants. This act of freezing the immigrant to the moment at which he 
or she gets off the plane (or boat) has the effect of reinforcing the essentialization of 
the immigrant, since, regardless of how many generations have passed, the 
immigrant remains an immigrant, and the process of immigration remains without an 
end. Thus, the moment of assimilation is continually deferred, and the immigrants‟ 
relationship to the society in which they reside, remains that of newcomers. Second, 
the concept of generation works to de-historicize „immigrants‟, to remove them from 
the currents of history, and thus excludes any political aspects of the „immigrant‟ 
experience. „Generations‟ is deployed as a temporal category that removes any 
political dimension from causal explanations. In other words, time is spatialized 
through the notion of generation. So the differences between the “first” generation 
and “second” generation are narrated as being due to the differences in assimilation 
into the host society and not as changes in historical context. The immigrant, over 
time, is to be transformed into a member of the host society (but, as was pointed out 
above, the transformation is never complete and constantly deferred).  
The immigrant imaginary has a wide circulation both in academic and popular 
culture. It provides the tools by which the identity of „immigrants‟ can be regulated 
and disciplined. It makes available the subject positions open to the immigrant 
communities and the conditions that underlie that opening. It is through the use of the 
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idea of the immigrant imaginary that the usual stories about Muslims in European 
plutocracies are written and disseminated. Issues of cultural schizophrenia are read 
as forms of generational conflict, the notion of dual allegiances (e.g. currently, the 
“problem” of being Muslim and Western), cruelty to animals, domestic violence and, 
of course, arranged marriages, provide policy-makers, professional provocateurs and 
academics with a steady diet of shock horror stories and statements. The immigrant 
imaginary is essentialist, teleological, and ultimately xenophobic. While, ostensibly, it 
has prided itself in its ability to narrate the transformations arising out of the migration 
process, its ontology subverts its epistemological ambition. It is a paradigm of social 
change that is unable to account for change except as a teleology. It is an attempt to 
understand social identities, which rests upon a pre-given “whatness” that is 
immutable and that determines the behavior of both immigrants and hosts. Ontically 
based analysis cannot provide a resolution of the Muslim question, since it leaves out 
any consideration of the processes of subject formation – of both Muslimness and 
Europeaness; processes which are at the forefront of current social developments. It 
is only by taking this ontological dimension into account that we can engage fully with 
very idea of European Islam. In other words, a European Islam that is not reducible 
to geographic or ethnographic descriptions requires an articulation between Europe 
and Islam at a conceptual level. 
There are two phases to this exercise: firstly, an implicit list is made of values 
which are associated with Europe and with Islam, and then these values are put to 
Muslims to be imported into their guided engagement with Islam so as to produce a 
European Islam. The difficulty, of course, arises with trying to come up with 
characteristic values for the European or Islamicate enterprises, which invariably 
amount to little more than narcissistic fantasies dressed as essential truths. As nearly 
all projects to articulate European Islam assert the primacy of the European 
enterprise, they necessarily depend on listing a cluster of values or cultural practices 
which are considered to be characteristic of European societies. Hence, calls to 
share values always demand of Muslims transformation of Muslim practices, but 
European societies are required only to tolerate Muslims. Secondly, these values are 
then used to exclude practices associated with Muslims. Thus it was that in 2006, 
Charles Clarke, the then British Home Secretary, in a speech in Washington 
declared four core beliefs of Islamists as totally antithetical to “Western Civilization” 
and as such no Western government could ever accommodate them. These 
included, and hence precluded any compromise on, the defence of freedom of 
speech, of gender equality, and opposition to the shariah law and to the 
establishment of the caliphate. 
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The idea that European societies are characterised by freedom of speech or 
gender equality is open to qualification on account of the fact that freedom of speech 
is restricted not only through legislation (e.g. Holocaust denial), but also through 
„sociological‟ factors, such as oligopolistic control of media. Similarly, gender equality 
is also undermined by various cultural factors. Nor is it clear that the distinction 
between Islamists and others can be organized in terms of the opposition or 
acceptance of freedom of speech or gender equality. The attempt to intimidate Al-
Jazeera, or legislation introduced in the UK against the „glorification of terrorism‟, all 
point to the far more complicated positions in which the trope of „freedom of speech‟ 
operates in the age of the „war against terror‟. As for gender equality, the 
institutionalized gender apartheid of Saudi Arabia has never been a significant 
hindrance to the description of the Saudi regime as moderate. Gender equality 
becomes, rather, a means of legitimating post-colonial „humanitarian‟ interventions 
(Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002).  
The arguments for a European Islam, however, neglect the persistence of 
Orientalism and instead focus on „progressive, modern values‟ embedded in 
European (Union) social practices. Specifically, it is argued that Western practices 
such as freedom of speech, democratic constraints on exercise of arbitrary power, 
and the de facto (if in many cases not de jure) separation between religious and state 
institutions allows Muslims to experiment in thought and deed about their creed, to 
reflect upon it in an atmosphere free from opprobrium and that this creates conditions 
for an Islamicate glasnost. European Islam could act as the vanguard of reform in the 
rest of the Muslim Ummah.  
This idea, however, is based on a rather generous understanding of Europe‟s 
„democratic culture‟ and the attitude of European authorities in relation to Islam. The 
reason why European governments‟ comportment towards Islamicate intellectual 
developments was one of benign neglect was because they did not consider such 
developments to have any more significance than developments in astrology: a set of 
esoteric practices of no general consequence. In this, there was a clear difference 
with the governments of Muslimstan, for whom Islam remained of crucial importance, 
and thus were unwilling to allow the free-flowing development of its interpretive 
literature. This argument in favour of European Islam sees differences between 
Western and Non-Western attitudes to Islam in terms of a difference in cultural 
values rather than different political and security interests. No government in 
Muslimstan, even the most resolutely „secularist‟, could afford an attitude of benign 
neglect towards developments in Islamic thinking. This can be seen clearly in 
Kemalist states, whose much-vaunted separation of church and state is only 
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accomplished by total expansion of the state to absorb all so-called religious 
institutions. Kemalist secularism is not a separation of mosque and state but rather 
the complete destruction of any independence of the mosque and its total 
internalisation within the bureaucratic structure of the state. It can also be clearly 
seen in the way in which, in the wake of the „war on terror‟, Western plutocracies 
have increasingly sought to control and direct Muslim debates and interpretations of 
Islam. Secret police surveillance of Muslim intellectuals, regulation and censorship of 
Muslim freedom of expression, use of torture (often out-sourced), extra-juridical 
measures, are all practices that are being used against Muslims in Europe as well as 
in Muslimstan. Increasingly, the difference between the European Union and 
Muslimstan in relation to the degree of autonomy permitted to Muslim articulations of 
Islam, is quantitative rather than qualitative, a matter of scale and degree. The space 
of autonomous development of Islamicate interpretations has radically shrunk. 
European Islam cannot be the name of an interpretation of Islam that arises from the 
free play of Muslim debate and engagement.  
The articulation of a European Islam proceeds from a denial of the universality of 
Islam, and its subordination to Europeaness. European Islam becomes another 
instance of Orientalism in which Islam acts as counter-factual mirror to narcissistic 
fantasies of Europeaness and exceptional grandness. Specifically, two major points 
can be made in relation to the project of European Islam: 
Firstly, the project begins by accepting (either implicitly or explicitly) that Islam is 
a religion, and religions are basically what Western Christianity becomes following 
the Wars of Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Islam, because it does not fit in 
this idea of religion, is therefore deviant or immature, and needs to be refashioned so 
that it will accord with this European based Enlightenment definition of religion.  
Secondly, this Enlightenment conception of religion is based on a series of 
assumptions which sees European history as universal history. In other words, 
developments in European cultural practices are assumed to have relevance for all 
other cultural formations. This can be clearly seen in the arguments which are often 
presented in favour of secularism. Secularism‟s supposed benefits can be grouped 
under three broad headings:34 
- Epistemological arguments based around the claim that without secularism 
there can be no scientific progress, and without scientific progress there could be no 
technological advances. In this sense, secularism as an epistemological category 
rather than a social one can be described as denoting a shift from an episteme 
                                               
34 For details of this argument see Sayyid, 2009. 
 
95 
centred on God to one centred on Man (sic). The core of the argument is that 
secularism de-legitimates the claims of religious authorities to control the production 
of knowledge, and creates the conditions for the rejection of ontological claims 
founded on sacred narratives in favour of a scientifically approved ontology. 
- Secularism is necessary to ensure civic peace and social harmony and to 
prevent religious passions from getting out of hand. By separating religion and 
confining it to the private sphere, secularism prevents differences in religious 
opinions from becoming the source of conflicts that would engulf a society‟s public 
space. Religious differences become matters of individual taste and therefore have 
little impact upon the organisation of social life at large. In addition, secularism 
prevents contending groups from making appeals to supernatural forces as a way of 
reinforcing their positions and keeps all parties on an even playing field in which 
debate cannot be short-circuited by such appeals. 
- Secularism presents the necessary pre-condition for the exercise of democracy 
– which, following Lefort‟s useful understanding, is based on keeping the space of 
power empty (1986: 279). The removal of God allows the space of power to be 
emptied. The claim being that democracy is a government that is ultimately based on 
the idea of the „sovereignty of the people‟, regardless of how this idea is expressed in 
reality (e.g. in Britain, it is the parliament which is sovereign not the people; however, 
the power of parliament derives from the people). Popular sovereignty seems to 
preclude any place for the idea of a sovereign God or sovereign priesthood. Thus the 
benefits of secularism help to define modernity itself. Modernity, of course, remains a 
narrative about Western exceptionality (Sayyid, 2003: 101-102), and thus secularism 
becomes a marker of Western identity. The epistemological, civic and democratic 
arguments for secularism are formulated as part of a narrative of Western 
exceptionally.  
European Islam is an Islam that can be accommodated within the Western 
notions of secularism and its presumed benefits. Specifically, the applicability of the 
three main arguments for secularism and their relevance for Muslims can be 
challenged by focusing on the experience of autonomous Islamicate cultural 
formations – that is, those cultural formations that existed prior to the colonial 
enframing of the planet. In other words, the shift from Western to Islamicate societies 
seemingly undermines the universal claims for secularism.  
So, for example, the idea of an epistemological case for secularism rests upon a 
conflict between science and church – a conflict that is often symbolized by the trial 
of Galileo. But the absence of an organized Church, made such clear demarcations 
between authority of religion and science difficult to draw within Islamicate societies. 
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Perhaps more importantly, the epistemological case for the benefits of secularism is 
based on the assumption that the understanding of the Divine in Islamic and Nasrani 
discourses is homologous. In the Christological conception of Divine, the Man (sic) 
and God occupy the same ontological plane, thus human endeavour can potentially 
compete with the Divine. The conjoining of human and divine spheres - as described 
through the category of incarnation in which divine and mundane fuse in the body of 
Christ - no doubt helps to sustain a perspective in which human and divine exist in 
the same dimension. Thus narratives of divine causality and intervention are locked 
in a zero-sum game with narratives that centre on human agency. As a 
consequence, science and religion continually collide within Nasrani discourses. 
Within Islamic interpretations the divide between Divine and human cannot be 
bridged. Islamicate reflections on the nature of the Divine have been very consistent 
in maintaining the gap between human and Divine spheres – a gap that is wide and 
permanent. This contrast between Nasrani and Islamicate discourses on the Divine 
cannot be seen as essential or foundational, since differences in reflections on the 
Divine indicate contingent conversations within various hermeneutic traditions, and 
not the uncovering of specific essences which are „hard-wired‟ within Christianity or 
Islam. After all, many of early Nasrani sectarian disputes often had a Christological 
element (e.g. controversies between those who accepted the interpretations of the 
Council of Chalcedon, and those who did not such as the Arians, Nestorians and 
Monophysites).  
The case for secularism as necessary for civic peace is largely based on 
extrapolating from the European experiences of the Wars of the Reformation and 
Counter-Reformation to make a general point about the relationship between civic 
peace and de-politicization of religious belief. As it has been pointed out, there is no 
direct analogue to sectarian warfare of such intensity and scale in Islamicate history 
and thus the idea that civic peace is only possible if religion is confined to the private 
sphere cannot be simply read from Islamicate history.35 Indeed, it is possible to make 
the very opposite case: the retreat of religion from the public sphere in Islamicate 
history has been most often associated with the breakdown of civic peace. For 
example, the often admired secularist order in Turkey was imposed from the top, 
upon an exhausted war-weary population. The secularism of the Turkish republic 
was not a response to demands of the Turkish masses but rather the desire of the 
Kemalist elites and their authoritarian project of Westernization. Secularism in the 
                                               
35
 The closest approximation is the conflict between the Fatmids and Abbassids. However, the 
infrastructural capacity of both Abbassid and Fatimids political orders were not sufficient to produce 
such an intensive form of violence - as experienced in the wars of religion in Europe. 
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context of Islamicate communities has often meant de-Islamization, and for most part 
has been imposed either by colonial regimes or Westernizing regimes. And these 
projects have all served to increase rather than reduce social conflict. Empirically, the 
scale and intensity of violence in Muslim countries which have been ruled by 
avowedly secular regimes has been such that it would not inspire much confidence 
about the relationship between secularism and civic peace. 
The argument that secularism is a necessary pre-condition of any political 
system of popular sovereignty ignores the possible ways in which popular 
sovereignty can be finessed, from the example of various constitutional monarchies 
to the suggestion by Mawdudi and others who re-described popular will as being vice 
regal rather than sovereign. In other words, the sovereignty of the Divine is an 
elaboration of the centrality of God to the cosmos but cannot be practical sovereignty 
in the formulation suggested by Carl Schmitt („the sovereign is who decides upon the 
exception‟) if for no other reason than that the idea of a monotheistic version of the 
omnipotent and omniscient God does not allow for the Divine to have any exception. 
It would seem that the meaning of secularism is perhaps to be found in attaching 
and articulating very different historical developments to the Plato-to-NATO 
sequence that encapsulates Westernese. The articulation of a global Muslim 
subjectivity, by threatening to reveal Plato-to-NATO as historiographical convention 
rather than history, contributes to the provincialization of Europe‟s final vocabulary. In 
the context of Muslims living in Western plutocracies the staples of the „immigrant 
imaginary‟ becomes strained, as categories such as religion, minority, „race‟ and 
others are seen more and more as part of the Plato-to-NATO sequence. The validity 
of this sequence rests upon the exercise of coloniality.  
The final argument made in favour of a European Islam is made not because of 
the benefits of such an interpretation of Islam for Muslims at large, but in terms of the 
benefits for an actually existing Europeaness. It is argued that articulation of 
European Islam is necessary to further integration and social cohesion. European 
Islam will enable Muslims in European to become European Muslims. That is, 
Muslim becomes another life-style adding to the superficial diversity of other life-
styles available in Western plutocracies: McMuslims for McWorld. The Muslim 
subject position is simply colonized by European expectations and demands of what 
a good Muslim should be. This good European Muslim, it is argued, is not only 
necessary to preserve social cohesion in Europe‟s urban centres. A good European 
Muslim is also the true essence of what a good Muslim should be. The idea of Euro-
Muslims distinct from other Muslims is based on the assumptions of an underlying 
supremacist discourse. It fails to acknowledge the possibility that universal values 
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and notions of good life can be generated from any historical community, that they do 
not require the slavish imitation of the royal road to wisdom pioneered in Western 
extremity of the Asian landmass. This way, when well-meaning Muslims and non-
Muslims assert that Islam is a religion of peace, they deny ability of Muslims to write 
their own history, that is, a history that does not read like something cribbed from 
Western history. Surely, the best response to those Islamphobes who insist upon the 
bellicose nature of Islam itself is not to counter such charges with attempts to show 
the peaceful nature of Islam, but rather to assert that Islam is Islam and the duty of 
Muslims is not to soothe the fantasies of Islamophobes but to show how these 
fantasies say more about Europeaness than Muslimness. Ultimately, European Islam 
is based on maintaining and reinforcing the distinction between West and Non-West 
which is constitutive of the colonial enframing of the world. It seeks to regulate and 
discipline Muslim demands for autonomy by reference to Europeaness.  
If Islam is not a religion in the manner that the European Enlightenment‟s 
hegemonic discourse would demand, then how are we to understand it? Perhaps 
one way would be to see Islam as inaugurating a distinct narrative. Islam begins with 
series of revelations received by the Prophet Muhammad (570-632) during the 610s 
(CE). The nature of these revelations has a family resemblance to many tropes found 
within the cultural milieu of the Nile to Oxus region, which can also be found at work 
in Jewish and Nasrani sacred stories. Islam orders these narratives of Abrahamic 
monotheism, placing itself as the culmination of a sequence of revelations associated 
with a diverse group of prophets, including figures such as Abraham, Moses and 
Jesus. Islam inaugurated a new semantic universe, which succeeded initially in 
radically transforming large parts of the Afroeurasian landmass so that themes that 
continued beyond the arrival of Islam could only do so through a cultural lexicon 
dominated by the venture of Islam. Islam is a language as well as a historical 
sequence by which Muslims can project themselves into the past and the future. 
Around this narration and constant re-narration of this sequence a community 
becomes sedimented. The Muslim Ummah, like other major historical communities, 
is able to generate the universal from the cultivation of its “own” language games. It 
is not clear what the articulation of a European Islam would achieve apart from 
maintaining and reinforcing the frontier between Europeaness and Non-
Europeaness, since a European Islam to be viable would have to be distinguished 
from a non-European Islam. As it has been pointed, the „violent hierarchy‟ between 
Europeaness and non-Europeaness is constitutive of Western racism (Hesse and 
Sayyid, forthcoming).   
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The idea of European Islam, then, belongs to an Age in which the ability of 
Muslims to write their history was constrained by the Westphalian order in which 
nation-states were able to regulate flows of peoples and information. A European 
Islam is difficult to sustain in the context of a planet unified by economic integration 
and U.S unipolarity. Attempts to fit the various mobilizations in the name of Islam in a 
European shaped hole do not recognize the postcolonial temper of the times. The 
movements and struggles for Muslim autonomy have become globalized. In the 
struggle for Muslim autonomy, the various attempts to produce domesticated 
interpretations of Islam are unlikely to be successful. The fate of European Islam is 
unlikely to be any different than the fate of a Saudi Islam or an Anatolian Islam; Islam 
has escaped to the general field of Muslim discursivity. Only a liberation of 
Muslimness and the establishment of overarching political structures able to house 
the global character of Muslim subjectivity is going to be successful in regulating the 
wars of interpretations being waged around Islam. Such structures are only likely to 
be established in the name of Islam itself.  
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